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Abstract
In this master thesis we investigate the effect of providing students with accurate
information about their peers’ time spent on homework. We use experimental data
collected from two surveys carried out on 10th grade students in Norway. The main
survey contained an intervention targeting students who spent below the median time
of their class on homework. These students were provided with information about the
actual median time spent on homework in their class. The follow-up survey consisted of
questions regarding the students’ beliefs. A partial population design was utilized in order
to capture any spillover effects, in addition to direct treatment effects.
Our main results suggests that the intervention was successful in correcting students’ beliefs.
Both the reduced form estimation and the instrumental variable estimation suggested
a positive treatment effect across our six outcome variables. We used three different
specifications, and while we see some differences between them, the main take-away
suggests a positive treatment effect.
Our analysis suggests some heterogeneity across students’ attitudes, but the evidence is
weak. We also check for heterogeneous effects of treatment and spillover conditional on
the students’ centrality in the peer group. We find some initial differences across these
subgroups, but the evidence is ambiguous and does not provide any clear insight into this
question.
We recommend further investigation of the direct behavioral changes of such an
intervention, as well as more in-depth investigation of the peer effects.
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1 Introduction
Most 10th graders do not enjoy homework. Despite substantial evidence suggesting
homework’s importance in improving student achievement (Eren and Henderson, 2008),
getting a high-schooler to actually put time and effort into the assigned homework can
sometimes seem like an impossible task. Researchers have proposed several reasons for
this sub-optimal investment, including the opportunity cost of study time (Metcalfe et al.,
2019), short-sightedness (Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002), and underestimation of the
expected returns to studying (Ersoy, 2019).
Although these articles raise compelling arguments as to why students underinvest in
homework, they fail to thoroughly consider the social side of the students’ life. Several
articles have studied how individuals are affected by their peers’ actions and beliefs
(Akerlof, 1991; Falk and Ichino, 2006). 10th graders seem to be particularly susceptible
to peer pressure (Brown, 2004). The desire to fit in and conform to the expectations of
the friend group affects behavior and choice (Bursztyn and Jensen, 2015). If a student
under-reports actual time spent on homework in order to better fit in, it might affect other
students’ choice as well. This feedback loop could further be enhanced by the friendship
paradox (Jackson, 2019), where students with many friendship ties are over-represented in
their friends’ peer samples. The behavior of the popular students would then be important
in the formation of norms regarding homework investment.
A field experiment was conducted by researchers at NHH during the school year of
2020/2021, targeting students who spend less time than the median in their class on
homework. An intervention was employed to correct the students’ expectations, in order
to nudge them to make more efficient choices regarding homework effort.
In this master thesis, we aim to investigate the effect of providing students with correct
information about their peers time spent on homework. Our goal is to assess whether the
information treatment has any effect on the misperceptions of students. We also want to
investigate the role of friendship ties in the spillover effect of this treatment. In order to
do so, we first measure the causal effect of the intervention by utilizing an instrumental
variable approach. Next, we look for spillover effects, exploiting the partial population
design of the experiment. Finally, we measure different network effects, including diffusion
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and centrality, by using the subjects self-reported friendship ties. We test our results for
heterogeneity and robustness by running our analyses on different sub-populations and
controlling for potential mechanical issues.
3
2 Background
2.1 Benefits of Homework
For the purpose of this paper, homework can be defined as any task assigned by
schoolteachers intended for students to carry out during non-school hours (Cooper,
1989). Most students, parents, teachers and researchers believe that homework can be an
important supplement to in-school academic activities, and that homework is a necessary
and valuable part of a student’s learning process. Researchers have suggested a long list
of positive consequences of homework, both in the academic and non-academic spheres
of life (Cooper et al., 2006). Homework generally requires students to complete tasks
with less supervision and under less severe time constraints than during school, which is
said to promote greater self-direction and self-discipline, better time organization, more
inquisitiveness, and more independent problem solving (Corno, 1994; Zimmerman et al.,
1996).
Even though our main focus does not involve the effects of homework on achievement, it
is still of great importance to our paper. Research on the relationship between homework
and academic achievement suggest that doing more homework can have a positive effect
on the students’ grades (Cooper et al., 2006). This forms the basis of our thesis, as
it is imperative that doing more homework yields a positive outcome on achievement
and in the development of non-cognitive skills when trying to influence students to do
more homework. We consider students who invest relatively small amounts of time to
homework, as it might be unclear whether students already spending a large amount of
time on homework will benefit from being pushed to do even more.
2.2 Student Effort
A student’s study effort is argued to be one of the most important determinants of their
human capital (Costrell, 1994), and it is a critical component of their education production
function (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2004, 2008). Studies have demonstrated that
students study more when incentives to do so increase (Hirshleifer et al., 2015; Azmat and
Iriberri, 2016), and that their beliefs about how much they need to study are often strong
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predictors of their actual decisions (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008). However,
previous work has also shown that students often have incorrect beliefs about their
own education production function, specifically about returns to their effort (Fryer Jr,
2016; Ersoy, 2019). Because of the importance of student effort and the incorrect beliefs
associated with it, understanding how students make their study effort decisions is of high
importance for both scholars and policymakers (Rury and Carrell, 2020).
The study effort decisions are also important for the students, as studying more implies less
time for non-studying activities such as leisure and work (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2003; Metcalfe et al., 2019). Thus, students must know their returns to study effort in
order for them to make efficient trade-offs between studying and non-studying activities
(Rury and Carrell, 2020).
2.3 Adolescence and Peer Effects
In the field of economics, researchers have accumulated large amounts of evidence on
the importance of peer effects. Group structures are ubiquitous in education and group
composition may have important effects on education outcomes. Furthermore, students
find themselves in different classrooms, living environments, schools, and social groups,
and are thus exposed to different peer groups, receive different education inputs, and face
different institutional environments (Garlick, 2013). Because of this, understanding how
social concerns or peer pressure impacts student’s beliefs and actions is of high importance
for both scholars and policymakers.
Researchers have found that adolescents in a particular peer group exhibit many similarities
compared with adolescents in other groups (Nurmi, 2004). This form of homogeneity
among individuals in peer groups has been reported in several characteristics, such as
aspirations (Kandel, 1978), problem behavior (Urberg et al., 1997) and schoolwork (Cohen,
1977).
The most widely repeated assertions about peer relations during adolescence are that
they become increasingly important and occupy an increasing amount of an individual’s
time (Brown, 2004). Starting from an early stage, children spend an increasing amount of
time with their peers both at school and after school (Larson and Richards, 1991), and
peer influence arises partly because popular youth often have the power to set styles and
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determine what activities will be undertaken (Brown, 2004).
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3 Literature
3.1 Effects of Receiving Information
Researchers have found that students’ beliefs about how much effort they need to put
into their schoolwork become more accurate upon receiving information. According to
Ersoy (2019), both information about an average individual and anecdotal information
moves student’s beliefs towards the information provided. Furthermore, students change
their study effort in the same direction as the shifts in their beliefs. Further backing this
theory, Azmat and Iriberri (2016) argues that information on how students compare to
their classmates is relevant when determining how much effort to exert.
Previous research show that providing students with feedback on their relative performance
has an impact on their future performance (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010; Bandiera et al., 2015),
while another part of the existing literature argues that students exert effort primarily
because they are compelled by cultural norms rather than objective rewards (Figlio et al.,
2019; Gneezy et al., 2019). Our paper differs in the fact that our main outcome variable
is planned time spent on homework, and that our main focus is correcting the student’s
misperceptions about peers’ study effort. The aforementioned papers on the other hand,
focuses on returns to study effort and the student’s perceived returns. However, our
paper will contribute to both parts of the existing literature, as we investigate both direct
treatment effects and spillover effects.
Azmat and Iriberri (2010) suggest two alternative explanations for why students would
react to the relative performance information. The first being that students might react
to additional information because individuals have inherently competitive preferences, or
that the presence of relative performance information instigate this type of competitive
preferences. In the presence of such competitive preferences, information that allows
for social comparison gives students utility from being ahead, and disutility from being
behind others.
The second explanation is that individuals’ imperfect knowledge of their own ability might
lead students to react differently to additional information, such that the information
is informative of the student’s own ability. An example of this is provided by Rury and
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Carrell (2020). In their paper, they study the effect of providing students with information
on returns to study effort and find that students who expect to receive low grades may
have inflated beliefs about how much effort they need to exert in order to improve their
performance. In turn, this leads them to provide effort that is potentially lower than they
would if they knew the true returns to effort. That is, if performance is a function of both
ability and effort, the self-perceived ability will affect the optimal choice of effort.
Based on these two explanations, all students would either choose high effort when
information is provided, leading to an observation of higher performance, or top performing
students would choose higher and bottom performing students lower effort, because this
information encourages high ability and discourages low ability students (Azmat and
Iriberri, 2010).
We see through prior research that the provision of information involving performance
feedback allows for social comparison, i.e., individuals can evaluate their own performance
by comparing themselves to others (Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). However, social comparison
does not only originate from received information through the treatment, but it is also
closely connected to the sharing of information among students, and the accompanying
peer effects. These peer effects are of great importance to our paper, as they could possibly
impact the aforementioned effects of receiving information.
3.2 Peer Effects on Student Effort
Whether or not students would benefit from interactions with other students is an
important question in existing research as well as in our thesis. The effect of peers on
a student’s performance is expressed in the findings of numerous researchers. Carrell
and Hoekstra (2010) and Figlio et al. (2019) found that the presence of disruptive peers
within classrooms would increase a student’s propensity to misbehave and disengage
during regular class time. While other researchers found that less disruptive behavior
and a sense of futility mediated peer effects on students’ academic performance (Avvisati
et al., 2013). A third finding is that hardworking peers might serve as role models that
inspire other students to put more effort into studying (Hoxby and Weingarth, 2005), and
furthermore Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2011) found that attending a secondary school
with high-ability peers increased students’ frequency of doing homework after school.
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However, these estimates may reflect, but not reveal, behavioral responses that amplify or
reduce the impact of educational quality. For instance, these responses might change over
time, and thus potentially influence results differently depending on when outcome data
are collected (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2011).
Educational researchers have also studied whether the effect of peer composition on
achievement is different for students with different academic abilities. Students at the
bottom of the test score distribution benefit significantly from the addition of students
who are at the 15th percentile of past test scores. Students at the top decile, benefit
strongly from the addition of classmates who are also at the top, while achievement for
students at the middle tends to be less affected by peer composition (Burke and Sass,
2008; Imberman et al., 2012)
3.3 Friendship Paradox
The friendship paradox refers to the fact that, on average, people have strictly fewer
friends than their friends have (Jackson, 2019). In his paper, Jackson suggests two reasons
why we should expect more connected individuals to behave systematically different from
less connected agents. The first is that people who have the most connections are also the
most exposed to interactions with others. This in turn leads to them being most heavily
influenced. The second is that if people differ in their taste for different activities, the
people who benefit the most from a given activity choose to have the most connections.
These two combined lead people’s most popular friends to engage the most in a behavior
and to bias the overall behavior in the society. Many forms of behavior are peer influenced
and driven by people’s perceptions of what is normal or acceptable behavior. The impact
of the friendship paradox on such behaviors can be seen in a series of studies that students
tend to overestimate the frequency of which their peers smoke or consume alcohol and
drugs, often by substantial margins (Jackson, 2019). In order for the friendship paradox
to have an effect in our case, the more popular students have to be more likely to do
more homework influencing their peers to do the same. Alternatively, they have to be
more likely to do less homework than the average. If this is the case, the students will be
treated, which enables them to spread the information among their connections.
Our study relates to the empirical literature on the diffusion of treatment effects through
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social networks. In a study on how participation in a microfinance program diffuses through
social networks, Banerjee et al. (2013) found that participants were significantly more
likely to pass information on to friends and acquaintances than informed non-participants,
but also that an individual’s decision is not significantly affected by the participation
of her acquaintances. The researchers found that the eigenvector centralities of initially
informed individuals are significant determinants of the eventual participation rate in a
village, while other variations in social network characteristics across villages are relatively
insignificant determinants of diffusion. Specifically, they found that individuals who have
more participating friends are more likely to participate because they are more likely




4.1 The Norwegian School System
The Norwegian school system is divided into three levels, Primary, lower-secondary and
upper-secondary schools and higher education. In Norway, the first 10 years of school are
mandatory for all children aged 6-16. These 10 years consists of primary school (1-7th
grade) and lower secondary school (8-10th grade). All adolescents aged 16-19 also have
the right to attend upper-secondary school, but it is not mandatory (Thune et al., 2019).
A standard school day for 10th graders in Norway lasts from approximately 08:30 to 14:00,
with small variations between different schools. Homework is assigned by the teachers,
and is completed outside of school hours.
4.2 Experimental design
The experiment was conducted by researchers at NHH from the fall of 2020 throughout
the spring of 2021. 17 schools were recruited to participate in the study from all over
Norway. The experimental program consisted of a main survey, wherein treatment was
delivered, and a follow-up survey.
The main survey was distributed to students during school hours, and completed under
the supervision of their respective teachers. It included questions regarding the subjects’
time use on homework and other activities outside of school hours, as well as questions
regarding both the personal and social value of these activities (see Appendix A1.1 for
the full survey). The students were also asked to name the other participants from their
class, whom they considered to be friends with, and what their belief was regarding their
classmates’ time spent on homework.
Treatment was delivered to students who during the first questions of the survey reported
that they spent less time than the median for their class on homework. Towards the end
of the survey, these students were shown a message as seen in Fig. 4.1, informing them
that they were among the students who spent the least time on homework in their class.
The message also included information about what the median time spent on homework
was in their particular class. Immediately after this message all the participating students
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were asked to report how much time they planned to spend on schoolwork outside of
school hours until they finished 10th grade (see Tab. 4.2).
Figure 4.1: Message displayed to treatment group.
Figure 4.2: Question regarding students’ planned time to homework.
4.3 Randomization
The randomization was conducted at a class level, defining treatment and control classes
based on predetermined stratas. Treatment was then delivered only to students in treated
classes who reported below median time spent on homework in their class. This "partial
population" design (Avvisati et al., 2013; Moffitt, 2000) makes it possible to capture not
only the direct effect of the intervention, but also the spillover effects. The difference
in outcomes between below-median students in treatment and control classes captures
the effect of being made eligible for the intervention, while the difference between the
above-median students in treatment and control classes captures the spillover effects of
the intervention.
4.4 Outcome variables
Throughout this thesis we will rely on six main outcome variables. These are constructed
from survey data, and measure different aspects of the students’ beliefs and behavior.
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4.4.1 Main survey
We use two outcome measures from the main survey. These are utilized to detect any
direct treatment effects. The first is Time planned on homework, and follows directly from
the survey. Here the students were asked to report how much time they were planning to
spend on homework every day until the end of 10th grade. We also use Planned homework
above median which tells us whether the students’ planned time is above the actual median
in their class.
4.4.2 Follow-up survey
In the follow-up survey we are more interested in examining the students’ beliefs, rather
than their behavior. Our main outcome measure is wedge which is a measure for
the difference between the students’ guessed proportion below median and the actual
proportion below median in the main survey. Next, we examine if the probability of
students to correctly guess the class median is affected by treatment through the variable
Correct guess. The two final outcome measures relate to the precision of this guess. The
first is Distance from correct guess, and measures the difference between the guessed
median and the actual median. The final variable, Absolute distance from correct guess
gives the absolute value for the difference between the guessed median and the correct
median. Together, these latter variables should allow us to assess the direction of any
over- or underestimation.
4.5 Balance testing
Randomized control trials (RCTs) build upon the assumption that true random assignment
of treatment stochastically distributes all baseline characteristics (Mutz et al., 2019).
While this does not guarantee perfect distribution of such characteristics, it does allows
researchers to make precise quantifiable inferences. What makes random assignment
superior to other approaches to inference about causation is the fact that there is an
underlying mathematical model supporting the probability of unequal distribution of
baseline characteristics. This implies that the researcher is enabled to evaluate the exact
probability of imbalances in covariates between treatment and control groups to appear.
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To concretize this notion, balance tests of baseline characteristics are usually carried
out when reporting on RCTs. The implications of such tests, however, are not entirely
straightforward. True randomization eliminates any external influence on treatment
indicators, implying that any differences between groups are due to chance. The test
statistics from balance testing has the interpretation of the probability that the difference
between two groups have occurred by chance, when there in fact is no difference. As noted
by Altman (1985) performing such tests "is to assess the probability of something having
occurred by chance when we know that it did occur by chance".
In this thesis we take a more pragmatic approach to balancing. We present a table of
baseline characteristics with means and differences between treatment and control group,
an approach similar to the one advocated by the CONSORT guidelines (Schulz et al.,
2010) and APSA standards (Gerber et al., 2014). In addition we present the test statistic
of an omnibus test on joint significance, following Hansen and Bowers (2008). This table
will serve as a starting point for our discussion. In the formal analysis, we will include only
those covariates that, ex ante, were argued to be influencing the outcome. This follows
the reasoning from Roberts and Torgerson (1999) and Mutz et al. (2019). More detailed
discussion of the relevant baseline characteristics follows in the next section, as well as
details regarding the selection procedure in chapter 5.
4.5.1 Baseline tests
Table 4.1 shows the result of standard tests for differences in means between treatment
and control group. Panel A shows the differences for students who spend less time on
homework than the median in their class. Only one of the baseline characteristics is
statistically different from zero. A coefficient of 0.13 for the row variable Female implies
that there are 13 percentage points more female students in the treatment group relative
to the control group. The estimate is significant at a 1 % level. In addition, expectations
parents > 3 is significantly different across the two groups at a 10 % level. All other
baseline characteristics seem to be fairly balanced.
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Table 4.1: Differences in baseline characteristics across treatment and control group
Mean C Mean T T-C (se) n.obs
Panel A: Below median
Female 0.29 0.40 0.13*** (0.040) 286
Time homework 13.80 14.60 1.74 (1.537) 287
Dislikes homework 0.86 0.81 −0.01 (0.035) 287
Grades
Standardized grade math −0.08 −0.154 −0.08 (0.107) 287
Standardized grade Norwegian −0.15 −0.29 −0.15 (0.127) 287
Returns to studying Norwegian 0.52 0.50 −0.08 (0.062) 287
Returns to studying math 0.65 0.62 −0.05 (0.070) 287
Attitudes
Importance grades > 3 0.87 0.80 −0.06 (0.042) 287
Pleasing parents > 3 0.61 0.60 0.04 (0.054) 287
Expectation of parents > 3 0.92 0.85 −0.08* (0.043) 287
Pleasing teachers > 3 0.48 0.49 0.02 (0.060) 287
Expectations of teachers > 3 0.84 0.83 −0.02 (0.039) 287
Importance of popularity > 3 0.76 0.74 0.01 (0.048) 287
Popularity schoolwork < 3 0.24 0.18 −0.05 (0.043) 287
Friendship
Number of in friends 3.09 2.96 −0.35 (0.264) 283
Number of out friends 2.92 2.89 −0.09 (0.263) 283
Number of reciprocal friends 6.01 5.84 −0.45 (0.511) 283
Eigencentrality 0.45 0.51 0.03 (0.037) 283
Many friends outside class 0.50 0.36 −0.09 (0.057) 287
Beliefs
Guessed median - class median main survey −16.13 −16.88 −2.22 (1.528) 287
abs(guessed median - class median) main survey 19.07 19.77 1.21 (1.069) 287
Wedge main survey 0.31 0.30 −0.01 (0.028) 287
Guessed median = class median main survey 0.11 0.12 0.01 (0.038) 287
Panel B: Above median
Female 0.61 0.55 −0.08** (0.033) 504
Time homework 47.27 47.09 −0.26 (1.644) 504
Dislikes homework 0.62 0.61 −0.01 (0.041) 504
Grades
Standardized grade math 0.07 0.07 −0.04 (0.068) 504
Standardized grade Norwegian 0.19 0.06 −0.20*** (0.066) 504
Returns to studying Norwegian 0.34 0.38 0.06 (0.039) 504
Returns to studying math 0.56 0.59 0.05 (0.041) 504
Attitudes
Importance grades > 3 0.93 0.86 −0.07*** (0.025) 504
Pleasing parents > 3 0.72 0.76 0.05 (0.037) 504
Expectation of parents > 3 0.92 0.91 −0.01 (0.018) 504
Pleasing teachers > 3 0.60 0.65 0.05 (0.037) 504
Expectations of teachers > 3 0.88 0.88 −0.02 (0.021) 504
Importance of popularity > 3 0.77 0.79 0.03 (0.026) 504
Popularity schoolwork < 3 0.16 0.20 0.04 (0.023) 504
Friendship
Number of in friends 2.97 2.87 −0.19 (0.196) 494
Number of out friends 3.08 2.91 −0.27 (0.224) 494
Number of reciprocal friends 6.05 5.79 −0.46 (0.413) 494
Eigencentrality 0.47 0.51 0.04 (0.025) 494
Many friends outside class 0.42 0.37 −0.03 (0.042) 504
Beliefs
Guessed median - class median main survey −4.25 −4.44 −0.51 (1.898) 504
abs(guessed median - class median) main survey 12.78 13.62 1.23 (1.028) 504
Wedge main survey 0.15 0.12 −0.05* (0.024) 504
Guessed median = class median main survey 0.28 0.27 0.00 (0.031) 504
Notes: Female is a manually coded variable based on the name of the student. The first and second columns
show the mean value of the row variables for the control and treatment group, respectively. The third column
shows the estimated coefficient from a regression of the baseline characteristic on treatment status, controlling
for strata fixed effects. The fourth column includes robust standard errors, clustered at the class level
(corresponding with randomization level). Each row includes a separate regression. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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In Panel B, we see a more stark difference between treatment and control group. In total,
4 of the 19 baseline characteristics tested are statistically different between the two groups.
Of these, two are significant at a 1 % level, one at a 5 % level and the final one at a 10 %
level. While these differences might seem dramatic, we argue that with proper care, we
are able to discuss our findings as reliable. In order for us to do so, we rely on two main
notions.
First, is the notion that randomized selection does not guarantee equal distribution,
only stochastic distribution of baseline characteristics (Mutz et al., 2019). This implies
that statistical testing of several baseline characteristics are prone to Type I error; the
test returns a statistically significant effect when there in fact is no such effect. The
probability that at least one of the tests return a significant result increases with the
number of baseline characteristics to be tested. We are confident that the randomization
was successful; there were no mechanical or technical issues with the implementation of the
randomization procedure. As long as the former statement is true, the differences between
treatment and control group as shown by the balance test only convey the random nature
of stochastic distribution.
In total we have data on 61 different classes distributed across the treatment (29) and
control group (32). While increasing this number would increase the probability of a
balanced distribution of baseline characteristics, we argue that we still have a decently
sized data set to work with.
Second, when conducting our analysis we are concerned about both the efficiency and
credibility of our model. With credibility, we refer to the degree in which our results truly
reflect the effect of a change in treatment status for an individual. While a randomized
and perfectly balanced data set provide strong arguments for credible results, we would
nevertheless be interested in arguing for the precision of our findings. The precision may
be considered as the propensity for Type II error; finding non-significant results when
there in fact are significant effects. A proven way to improve upon a statistical analysis is
to include covariates in the analysis. An important prerequisite for improving the model
is that the researcher provides some theoretical or empirical evidence, or at the very least
well-substantiated suspicions, that the covariate affects the outcome variable of interest.
Any covariates which meet these requirements should be included in the analysis in order
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to increase the precision of the estimates.
The important implication from this discussion is that any such covariates should be
included in the analysis regardless of their significance in a balance test (Mutz et al., 2019).
In our analysis we include covariates we suspect could affect the outcome of interest,
based on ex ante discussion. These covariates include indicators for gender, baseline time
spent on homework, attitudes towards homework, grades, perceived returns to studying
and popularity measures. Coincidentally, several of these covariates coincide with the
unbalanced baseline characteristics in Table 4.1.
In addition to the individual regressions, we also conducted an omnibus test, following
Hansen and Bowers (2008). This method effectively tests for joint significance for all
baseline characteristics. Running the test separately for Panel A and Panel B gives a
p-value of 0.029 and 4.195e 05, respectively. These low p values imply that the samples
are indeed unbalanced, and confirms our suspicions from the individual balance tests.
In summary, we argue that while our sample seems to be subject to some imbalances
in baseline characteristics, careful attention to the issue of balance and randomization
combined with meticulous treatment of the covariates should allows us to conduct our
analysis with confidence that the estimates it provides are both precise and efficient. Still,




The main goals of our empirical analysis are to estimate the causal effect of the intervention,
identify any spillover effects from the treated to the non-treated, and study the spillover
effects in relation to network characteristics. More specifically, our main outcome variable
for the first part of the analysis is planned time spent on homework, which captures the
students study intentions following the treatment. In the second part of the analysis we
will focus on the beliefs of the students regarding their peers’ time spent on homework, as
reported in the follow-up survey.
5.1 Instrumental Variable approach
When working with a field experiment, as described in chapter 4, we have to consider the
possibility of treatment dilution and imperfect take-up (Angrist and Pischke, 2014). In
order to circumvent this issue we utilize an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach. This
method employs an instrument, in place of the suspected endogenous variable, which
allows for only the exogenous part of the explanatory variable to be captured in the model.
This method allows us to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE), as opposed
to the intention to treat (ITT) from the reduced form.
Successful IV-estimation requires the use of a valid instrument. There are three main
assumptions that has to be satisfied for this approach to be meaningful (Angrist, 2006).
The relevance assumption requires the instrument to have a significant effect on the
instrumented variable. This assumption is trivial in its identification, and can be examined
through a regression of the instrument on the instrumented variable. Formally it translates
to Cov(X,Z) 6= 0
In addition to the relevance condition, the instrument also has to be uncorrelated with
the unobserved random effects captured in the regression model, often formulated as
Cov(Z, u) = 0. This requirement is separated into two assumptions, the exclusion
restriction and independence assumption (Angrist et al., 1996). These assumptions
relates to the channels in which the instrument is affecting the outcome variable, and
the distribution of the instrument. The exclusion restriction requires the instrument to
only affect the outcome through the instrumented variable. The independence assumption
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requires random distribution of the instrument.
5.1.1 Instrumental variables in randomized control trial
Randomized control trials are by many considered the gold standard in estimation of
causal effects (Angrist et al., 1996), however, this approach requires the researcher to
be able to imagine the outcome in the counterfactual situation of no treatment. With
random distribution of treatment to a sufficiently large sample, it is possible to argue that
the average difference between treated and non-treated corresponds to the average causal
effect (Angrist and Pischke, 2014). These types of analyses are usually difficult to perform
properly in social sciences, as they require no treatment dilution nor any non-compliance.
Often an alternative approach is to combine RCTs with IV-estimation (Angrist, 2006;
Angrist et al., 1996). The novel idea here is to use assigned treatment as an instrument
for actual delivered treatment. This allows us to interpret the estimated effect as LATE,
which corresponds to the effect of the instrumented variable on the compliers, rather than
as an ITT effect.
In this application of the IV framework, the necessary assumptions for a valid instrument
becomes somewhat trivial. By design, our instrument is both strongly correlated with the
instrumented variable and randomly assigned. This implies that the relevance assumption
and independence assumption are satisfied. We provide evidence for a significant first
stage regression in the formal empirical estimation in Appendix A2.1.
The exclusion restriction may require some discussion and external motivation in other
applications, but for our specific case it is quite trivial. Being randomly assigned to
treatment by external researchers should have no impact on the outcome variable of
the student whatsoever, if not for delivered treatment. This implies that by design, our
instrument is strong and arguably valid for our purposes.
5.2 Empirical model
We specify the identifying model which we estimate separately on students above and
below the median of time spent on homework. This approach is similar to the one employed
by Avvisati et al. (2013), utilizing the partial population design of the experiment, and
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allows us to identify the direct effects of being treated by the intervention, as well as the
spillover effects of having treated students in your class. The first-stage regression shows
the effect of the instrument on the instrumented variable.
Dic = ↵1 +  Zic +  Xic +  1c + e1ic (5.1)
Following the naming convention used in Angrist & Pischke (2015), Dic is the instrumented
variable, delivered treatment for individual i in class c. Zic denotes the instrument, and
corresponds to the randomly assigned treatment for individual i in class c. Xic is a vector
of control variables for individual i in class c, and  1c are dummy indicators for strata
fixed effect. e1ic represents unobserved individual random effects.
We get the corresponding reduced form equation by directly regressing the instrument on
the outcome variable:
Yic = ↵0 + ⇢Zic +  0Xic +  0c + e0ic (5.2)
where Yic represents the outcome measure for student i. Xic is a vector of control variables
for individual i in c, and  0c are dummies for strata fixed effects. e0ic is the unobserved
individual random effects. The parameter ⇢ represents the ITT and reflects the effect of
being made eligible for treatment.
The fitted values from estimation 5.1 are then substituted into the second stage regression
in place of the instrumented variable. This gives the following formal estimation:
Yic = ↵2 +  D̂ic +  2Xic +  2c + e2ic (5.3)
where Yic is still the outcome variable, D̂ic is the fitted values from the first stage regression,
Xic is the same vector of controls as in the first stage,  2c represents strata dummies, and
e2ic is the unobserved individual random effects. The parameter of interest here is  , which
captures the instrumented variable’s effect on the outcome variable through the instrument.
The estimated   for students with below median time spent on homework corresponds to
the treatment effect, while for students above median time spent, it corresponds to the
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spillover effects.
We specify three different models. Model (1) is the simplest and only controls for strata
fixed effects. Model (2) includes covariates that ex ante were argued to potentially affect
the outcome measures. Model (3) choose the individual control variables Xic based on a
double lasso selection procedure (Belloni et al., 2014). This method effectively allows us
to choose the appropriate control variables in a high-dimensional data-set by utilizing a
two stage process (Urminsky et al., 2016). First, we identify the covariates that predict
the dependent variable, then the ones that predict the independent variable. The final
regression model is fitted with the variables that have been estimated to have non-zero
effects in the two prior steps.
To avoid issues with incorrect standard errors, we use the built in 2SLS function in STATA
to conduct our estimations. In addition, we cluster the standard errors at the class level
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Randomization of treatment was conducted at class level,
and thus the clustering should follow the level of randomization.
5.3 Heterogeneity analysis
We test for heterogeneous results across subgroups by modifying the estimated equations
above. We estimate the difference by introducing an interaction term to our estimation.
By interacting the indicator for treatment and the characteristic we want to test for
heterogeneity across, we get a model that singles out the effect of being treated in a
specific subgroup. Below, only the second stage is shown, however in practice we follow
the same estimation strategy as above.
Yic = ↵2 +  D̂ic +  2Aic + ⇣2(A⇥ Z)ic +  2Xic +  2c + e2ic (5.4)
Where Yic is the outcome measure, Xic is a vector of control variables for individual i in
class c,  2c controls for strata fixed effects, and e2ic is the unobserved individual random
effects. Aic here represents the subgroup identifier. This is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if individual i in class c belongs to a specific subgroup, and 0 otherwise.
The interaction term is a dummy representing whether the individual belongs to a certain
subgroup and is treated. The coefficient of interest in this model is ⇣2 which represents
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the relative difference between treatment effect for individuals in the subgroup and not in
the subgroup.
5.3.1 Network effects
In addition to the direct and indirect effects, we are interested in identifying how different
network characteristics affect the diffusion of treatment effect. In particular, we want to
examine how network characteristics such as eigenvector centrality and degree distribution
affect the magnitude of spillover effects. The main idea is that if the treated students in
one class are more central in their networks relative to other classes, the spillover effect
should be stronger due to a higher degree of interaction between treated and non-treated
students.
We test for this by further specifying our heterogeneity analysis. First, we calculate the
degree distribution and eigenvector centrality for each friend network, using GEPHI. These
variables are then used to construct measures for the centrality of the treated individuals
in different classes. Consolidating this with the above approach to heterogeneity analysis
allows us to estimate the difference in treatment effect conditional on the initial injection
point. This approach bears similarities with Banerjee et al. (2013).
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6 Analysis
6.1 Reduced Form Estimation
We start out our analysis by testing for ITT effects by estimating equation 5.2. The
dependent variable is different measures for the students’ beliefs regarding their future
time use on schoolwork. Table 6.1 presents the beta coefficient from the estimations.
All three models (1, 2, 3) suggests that being below median in a class that is made eligible
for treatment is associated with an increase in the amount of time planned for homework.
The first row represents the mean time planned, while the second row represents the
probability for the student to plan more homework than the actual median in the class.
There are some differences between the three models. In the first row, we find some
difference in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient between model (1) and the other
two. In the second row, model (2) reports a slightly higher estimated coefficient relative
to the other two. However, the differences are not dramatic, and the significance and
general interpretation of the results remain stable across all models.
Table 6.1: Direct intention to treat effects from the main survey
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Pre-determined controls Double Lasso Selection
Panel A: Direct effect
Time planned homework 8.149*** 8.457*** 8.480***
(2.295) (2.811) (1.921)
Planned homework above median 0.154*** 0.240*** 0.153***
(0.058) (0.060) (0.056)
N 287 286 286
Panel B: Spillover effect
Time planned homework −2.006 −3.208 −4.405*
(2.988) (2.640) (2.264)
Planned homework above median −0.010 −0.026 −0.031
(0.029) (0.029) (0.026)
N 504 504 504
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from the reduced form regression using only indicators for strata
fixed effects as covariates. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a similar regression, but also including
pre-determined controls. Model (3) shows the coefficient from a PDS-lasso regression, utilizing a post
double lasso selection procedure in order to determine which covariates to include. Robust standard errors
clustered at class level in parenthesis below each coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
6.1 Reduced Form Estimation 23
Considering model 2 (3), the magnitude of the coefficients in the first row implies that
being made eligible for treatment is associated with a 8.457 (8.480) minutes increase
in average time planned for homework. Further, the second row implies a 24.0 (15.3)
percentage points increase in probability for the students to plan more time to homework
than the median in their class. Not only do the students plan more time for homework
after the treatment, but on average the probability that they plan more than the median
in their class is increased. The link between treatment and effect seems to be consolidated
through these estimations.
Next, we consider the reduced form estimation of the relationship between treatment and
the students’ ability to correctly guess their peers’ time spent on homework as reported
in the follow-up survey. Table 6.2 shows the beta coefficient from estimating equation 5.2
with measures for the precision in students’ guesses as the dependent variable.
Table 6.2: Direct and indirect intention to treat effects from the follow-up survey
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Pre-determined controls Double Lasso Selection
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up −0.103*** −0.082 −0.104***
(0.035) (0.050) (0.033)
Correct guess 0.053 0.084 0.064
(0.057) (0.055) (0.053)
Distance from correct guess 5.133** 5.895** 4.539**
(2.296) (2.979) (2.030)
Absolute distance from correct guess −3.998** −5.033*** −4.235***
(1.686) (1.679) (1.542)
N 218 217 217
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.057** −0.055* −0.039*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022)
Correct guess 0.052 0.050 0.051
(0.047) (0.056) (0.044)
Distance from correct guess 0.190 0.354 −0.760
(1.972) (1.792) (1.625)
Absolute distance from correct guess −0.082 −0.525 −0.422
(1.109) (1.161) (0.921)
N 400 400 400
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from the reduced form regression using only indicators for strata
fixed effects as covariates. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a similar regression, but also including pre-
determined controls. Model (3) shows the coefficient from a PDS-lasso regression, utilizing a post double
lasso selection procedure in order to determine which covariates to include. Robust standard errors clustered
at class level in parenthesis below each coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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The first row of Panel A suggests that being made eligible for treatment is associated
with a decrease in guessed proportion below median. The measure wedge indicates the
difference between the student’s guessed proportion of classmates being below median
and the actual proportion below the median. A negative estimated coefficient implies that
students eligible for treatment on average guess that fewer of their peers are below the
median. Model (1) and (3) are statistically significant at a 1 % level, and while model (2)
is not significant at any conventional level, a p-value of 0.106 tells us it is very close to
the 10 % level. It is important to note that the students were not tasked with guessing
how many of their peers were below the median in the follow up survey, but that they
were tasked with guessing how many of their peers reported being below median in the
main survey.
The third row of Panel A suggests that students made eligible for treatment guess a higher
median than the actual median in their class. The findings in row 4 suggest that the
absolute difference between guessed median and actual median is decreasing for eligible
students. An explanation for this might be that students were underestimating ex ante.
The treatment nudged these students to reconsider their initial guesses, and on average,
increase their guessed median. Consolidated, the results from row 1, 3 and 4 suggest that
while students are increasing their relative distance to the correct median (that is, they
are overestimating more), the net effect of reducing the prior underestimation is such that
the absolute distance is reduced. The total effect seems to be that students eligible for
treatment are better at guessing than their non-treated peers.
We also see some spillover effects in the first row of Panel B. Model (1) and (2) report a
coefficient at about 50 % the magnitude of the direct effect, while model (3) has estimates a
somewhat weaker relationship. All models are statistically significant at conventional levels.
The estimated coefficient implies that there are some dynamic between the students that
allow for the treatment to also affect some of the non-eligible students. More specifically,
students having peers below median who are made eligible for treatment in their class are
more inclined to guess a higher proportion above median.
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6.2 Instrumental variable estimation
Moving on to the instrumental variable estimation, we now consider the local average
treatment effect. Table 6.3 shows the beta coefficient from estimating equations 5.1 and 5.3
as in a two-stage least squares regression. Due to the mechanical aspect of our analysis, we
do not find it necessary to show the first stage regression. By assumption our instrument is
highly relevant, and any additional information from the first stage is not key in analyzing
our data. However, all first-stage regressions are reported in Appendix 2.
The first row of Panel A in Table 6.3 suggests that being treated is associated with an
increase in time planned on homework in the future. This suggestion is further reinforced
by the second row which implies that treated students also have a higher probability
of planning more homework than the median relative to their non-treated peers. The
coefficients seems to be of about the same magnitude as their ITT counterparts, with
the exception of model (3) which reports a slightly stronger effect. Considering that the
LATE is a local measure for the effect on the treated and the ITT effect only considers
the eligibility for treatment, it would be reasonable to expect such a difference.
Table 6.3: Direct treatment effects from the main survey
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Pre-determined controls Double Lasso Selection
Panel A: Direct effect
Time planned homework 8.329*** 7.964*** 9.157***
(2.257) (2.491) (2.031)
Planned homework above median 0.158*** 0.229*** 0.165***
(0.056) (0.054) (0.056)
N 287 286 286
Panel B: Spillover effect
Time planned homework −0.900 −2.125 −2.873
(2.965) (2.826) (2.802)
Planned homework above median −0.000 −0.022 −0.028
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
N 504 504 504
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from an IV-regression using only indicators for strata fixed effects as
covariates. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a similar IV-regression, but also including pre-determined
controls. Model (3) shows the coefficient from an IV-lasso regression, utilizing a post double lasso selection
procedure in order to determine which covariates to include. Robust standard errors clustered at class
level in parenthesis below each coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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The difference in estimated coefficients between the three models are mainly driven by the
covariates. We see that model (1) and (2) are quite similar, with (2) reporting a slightly
lower coefficient. Model (3) differs somewhat more, suggesting about 10 % stronger effect
in time planned on homework. For probability of time planned to be above the median,
the estimate from model (2) is higher than the two other. Significance seems stable across
all three models.
Overall, these estimations imply that informing students about the median time their peers
spend on homework is sufficient to nudge them to plan more study time for themselves.
Furthermore, the effect seems to be strong enough to substantially increase the proportion
of below-median students who plan to do more homework than the median.
Table 6.4 is comparable to table 6.2, however with estimated LATEs instead of ITT effects.
The estimated coefficients in the first row of Panel A suggests a positive effect on students
ability to correctly guess their peers answers. The magnitude of the coefficients are quite
similar to those from the ITT estimation. Model (2) is significant at a 5 % level, while
model (1) and (3) exhibit an even higher significance level of 1 %.
The second row of Table 6.4 suggests a positive effect on students ability to perfectly
guess their peers answers on time use. The coefficient of model (2) implies that students
whom receive treatment are 10.9 percentage points more likely to correctly guess their
peers answers perfectly. The estimate is significant at a 5 % level. Model (1) and (3) do
not suggest any significant treatment effects.
The third row further confirms the relationship suggested in 6.2, however with the main
difference that model (3) yields a non-significant estimate. The fourth row follows in the
same fashion, with model (1) and (2) having the same interpretation as in table 6.2, while
model (3) is non-significant.
We also find some evidence for spillover effects in the local treatment effects. The first
row of model (1) and (2) of Panel B suggests that students whom are not treated but
who are in the same class as someone treated, guess that 7.3 (5.7) percentage points more
of their peers report spending more time than the median in their class on homework.
Model (1) and (2) estimate a statistically significant relationship at the 5 % level, while
model (3) is only significant at the 10 % level with a weaker estimated relationship.
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Table 6.4: Direct and indirect treatment effects from the follow-up survey
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Pre-determined controls Double Lasso Selection
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up −0.109*** −0.091** −0.097***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.037)
Correct guess 0.066 0.109** 0.052
(0.054) (0.046) (0.051)
Distance from correct guess 4.930** 5.939** 2.890
(2.150) (2.428) (2.091)
Absolute distance from correct guess −3.796** −4.977*** −2.148
(1.587) (1.470) (1.511)
N 218 217 217
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.073** −0.057** −0.059**
(0.030) (0.025) (0.028)
Correct guess 0.077 0.083 0.069
(0.049) (0.054) (0.054)
Distance from correct guess 1.266 0.182 0.211
(2.163) (1.550) (1.695)
Absolute distance from correct guess −0.482 −1.008 −1.234
(1.148) (1.065) (1.244)
N 400 400 400
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from an IV-regression using only indicators for strata fixed effects as
covariates. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a similar IV-regression, but also including pre-determined
controls. Model (3) shows the coefficient from an IV-lasso regression, utilizing a post double lasso selection
procedure in order to determine which covariates to include. Robust standard errors clustered at class level in
parenthesis below each coefficient. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Consolidating our findings, we see some evidence for positive treatment effect, as well as
some spillover effects. The results remain significant across several model specifications.
6.3 Heterogeneity analysis
The following section presents the results from a heterogeneity analysis. Based on the
existing literature, we have reasons to believe that different sub-samples might respond
differently to the treatment. In order to test for these differences, we re-estimate our
model including an interaction term between the suspected heterogeneity indicator and the
treatment variable. In essence we estimate model 5.4. We perform separate estimations
across all characteristics we suspect might be subject to heterogeneity issues. Table 6.5
summarizes the coefficients of the interaction terms from the estimations.
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6.3.1 Grades
According to Azmat and Iriberri (2010), higher-achieving students might respond differently
to information treatment than low-achieving students. The authors argue that due to the
high-achieving students’ relatively higher ability to implement new information in their
decision making, they should see a stronger effect among the top performing students.
The first two columns of Table 6.5 show the coefficient of the interaction term between
treatment and a dummy for whether the student achieved a grade of 5 or higher on their
latest math and Norwegian test, respectively. We notice that only two of the coefficients
are significantly different from zero, suggesting that students that achieve a grade of 5
or higher in math or Norwegian have a lower distance from the correct guessed median
relative to the students achieving a grade of 4 or lower. The estimated effect is about 1.4
times as strong for the math grade than for the Norwegian grade.
From Panel B we see some evidence that high achieving students in math guess a lower
absolute distance from median, and high achieving students in Norwegian guess a higher
relative distance from the median. Both estimates are significant at a 10 % level.
These results suggest some heterogeneity in the treatment effect, dependent on the subjects
grades. There seems to be some correlation between stronger treatment effect and high
achieving students. This could have further implications for how to most efficiently
implement such an intervention on a larger scale, and deserves careful consideration.
6.3.2 Gender
The third column of Table 6.5 suggests that female respondents are relatively better at
guessing correctly (second row of Panel A). This effect is significant at a 10 % significance
level, and the estimated coefficient is relatively large compared to the main effects from
Table 6.3.
As with achievement, this result also supports the notion of some heterogeneity, however
the evidence is only apparent for one of the outcome variables and the significance is weak.
We should be cautious in interpreting these results.
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6.3.3 Utility from homework
Another interesting notion is that the students’ preferences might affect how perceptible
they are to treatment. One could argue that students whom derive low utility from
schoolwork might underestimate the amount of time their peers spend on schoolwork. For
these students we would expect to see a stronger treatment effect due to the fact that
their guesses are already disproportionately lower than their peers.
From column 4 in Table 6.5 we see some evidence of this intuition. All the coefficients
displayed support the intuition that a weaker treatment effect is associated with students
who derive low utility from homework. The first row suggests they guess that a higher
proportion of their peers are below median in time spent on homework. The second row
suggests a lower proportion of correct guesses. The third and fourth row consolidated
implies that these students are worse at guessing, and that they have a propensity for
underestimating, relative to their peers. All the estimates remain statistically significant
at conventional levels.
Similarly, we see some significant effects in column 5. Both row 1 in Panel A and, row 2 and
4 in Panel B suggest that students who believe spending time on homework contributes to
lower popularity is associated with a weaker treatment and spillover effect than their peers.
We see a 20.4 percentage points lower spillover effect on proportion of perfect guesses
relative to their peers, and their absolute distance to correct guess is 5.698 minutes higher
than their peers.
6.3.4 Network effects
We test different network effects by constructing a measure for the average centrality of
the treated students in each class. This measure is then used to create sub-samples of
students in classes with higher or lower than average centrality for below-median students.
The reported estimates show the difference in effect for students whom have treated peers
that are more or less central than average. The results of the estimation is presented
in Table 6.6. The first column shows the estimated effect of having the below-median
students have higher eigencentrality than average. The remaining columns show the
estimated effect of having the below-median students have a higher than average total
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amount of friends (degree), in-friends (indegree), out-friends (outdegree) and reciprocal
friends, respectively.
Since we are interested in contact between students in order to facilitate treatment transfer,
we allow one-way reported friendship ties to be interpreted as communicative. The rational
behind this is that any form of friendship requires reciprocal involvement. Thus, it is
reasonable to consider the different measures for friendship ties as indicators of interaction
between students. Still, we estimate models separately for each measure as it allows for
more nuanced discussion.
Table 6.6: Network effects: Centrality of Panel A
Eigencentrality Total friends In-friends Out-friends Reciprocal friends
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up 0.082 0.004 −0.193 0.027 0.006
(0.065) (0.083) (0.121) (0.067) (0.068)
Correct guess −0.033 −0.103 −0.000 0.006 0.098
(0.112) (0.127) (0.160) (0.119) (0.142)
Distance from correct guess −3.994 3.304 3.636 5.050 6.772*
(3.205) (4.770) (7.489) (3.946) (4.096)
Absolute distance from correct guess 2.334 −0.485 1.108 −3.482 −6.900**
(2.648) (3.478) (4.610) (3.055) (2.997)
N 217 217 217 217 217
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.006 0.045 −0.113* 0.102* 0.037
(0.040) (0.069) (0.067) (0.060) (0.068)
Correct guess −0.094 0.017 0.064 0.017 −0.055
(0.068) (0.085) (0.120) (0.100) (0.105)
Distance from correct guess −2.600 1.972 2.954 6.186* 4.128
(2.751) (4.270) (4.322) (3.648) (3.091)
Absolute distance from correct guess 3.517* −1.472 −1.070 −1.848 3.095
(2.107) (2.564) (3.042) (2.924) (2.164)
N 400 400 400 400 400
Notes: Heterogeneity analysis by adding an interaction term to the IV-regression. The interaction term is dependent on
network characteristics of the below-median students. The model controls for pre-specified covariates and is coinciding
with Model (2) from the main analysis. Robust standard errors clustered at class level in paranthesis. Each cell is a
unique regression. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Since we are mainly interested in investigating the heterogeneity in spillover effects, we
begin by considering Panel B.
The fourth row of column one suggests that high eigencentrality among the treated students
is associated with a larger difference between believed median and correct median. This
is a somewhat surprising result as it implies that treating students with high centrality,
and thus high propensity for interacting and initiating spillover effects, is associated with
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a weaker spillover.
Column two, three and four show the estimated coefficient from estimations with the
interaction term depending on different measures of friendship ties. The first row suggests
a correlation between the treated students having many in-friends and a stronger spillover
effect, while having many out-friends is associated with a weaker spillover effect. We
see no effect for reciprocal friends. These results are interesting as the they suggests the
opposite of what one would expect. It would be reasonable to argue that treated students
with many out-friends would have a higher frequency of interaction, and thus would be
more inclined to see a stronger treatment effect.
Due to the ambiguity of the estimated effects, we do not find enough convincing evidence
to argue for clear heterogeneity in spillover effect conditional on centrality measures. Our
results do, however, motivate further investigation of this issue, as there seems to be some
mechanism at play that our data set and specification is not able to pick up.
In Panel A we see some evidence that suggests heterogeneity in the direct treatment effect.
The estimated coefficient of row 3 and 4 suggests an association between the treated
students having many reciprocal friends, and a stronger treatment effect. The mechanism
of this relationship could depend on treated students exchanging information about the
treatment with each other, thus amplifying the treatment effect.
As discussed earlier, we are interested in the effect of interaction between treated and
non-treated students. Since we are not able to directly observe such interaction, we rely on
self-reported friendship ties. Following the discussion of the direction of such ties, it is also
interesting to investigate any heterogeneity dependent on the network characteristics of the
non-treated students. High frequency of interaction between above-median students could
lead to heterogeneous spillover effects. This could for example be due to an above-median
student seeking social interaction with several treated students. This mechanism closely
relates to the friendship paradox Jackson (2019). We consider this effect in Table 6.7
These estimations suggests some differential effects for above median students with many
friends. We see this through the first row of column 2 in both Panel A and Panel B. The
estimated coefficient suggests that a high number of friends among the treated above
median students is associated with a lower wedge. In addition, row four of the same
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column suggests a correlation between overestimation and total number of friends. In
Panel B we find some evidence for weaker spillover effects, while still maintaining some of
the overestimation also found in Panel A.
Table 6.7: Network effects: Centrality of Panel B
Eigencentrality Total friends In-friends Out-friends Reciprocal friends
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up 0.073 −0.278*** −0.094 −0.104 −0.021
(0.084) (0.071) (0.070) (0.077) (0.054)
Correct guess −0.279* 0.018 0.117 −0.220* 0.028
(0.158) (0.112) (0.110) (0.119) (0.105)
Distance from correct guess −9.462* 10.715*** 5.644 1.624 1.418
(4.980) (3.249) (4.405) (4.147) (2.973)
Absolute distance from correct guess 9.325** −2.783 −3.872 1.991 0.753
(4.172) (3.411) (3.360) (3.979) (2.712)
N 217 217 217 217 217
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.043 −0.105* 0.070 −0.035 −0.006
(0.071) (0.062) (0.078) (0.058) (0.050)
Correct guess −0.269** −0.061 −0.356*** −0.044 −0.038
(0.137) (0.116) (0.117) (0.126) (0.102)
Distance from correct guess −1.020 6.351* −4.569 2.036 3.356
(4.679) (3.735) (4.919) (3.601) (2.775)
Absolute distance from correct guess 7.322** 3.143 9.393*** 4.657 1.674
(3.283) (2.617) (3.093) (3.156) (2.474)
N 400 400 400 400 400
Notes: Heterogeneity analysis by adding an interaction term to the IV-regression. The interaction term is dependent on
network characteristics of the above-median students. The model controls for pre-specified covariates and is coinciding with
Model (2) from the main analysis. Robust standard errors clustered at class level in paranthesis. Each cell is a unique
regression. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Column three of Panel B suggests high amount of in-friends among above median students
in treated classes is associated with a substantially lower proportion of correct guesses
and higher distance from correct guess.
Finally, we specify our analysis to consider the difference between students with more or
less than one treated friend. The estimations are consolidated in Table 6.8. We do not
see any clear signs of heterogeneity in the spillover effects. The only exception is a weakly
significant estimate that suggests some association between high number of treated friends
and higher distance from correct guess.
In Panel A, however, we find some more interesting insights. First, the coefficient reported
in the third row of column one suggests that having a lot of treated friends is associated
with a lower distance from correct guess. Next, we find some evidence of a correlation
between having many treated out-friends and stronger treatment effect. One reasonable
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explanation of this is that students who interact more with other treated students are
subject to an amplification of treatment.
Table 6.8: Network effects: Number of treated friends
In-friends Out-friends Reciprocal friends
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up 0.040 −0.103* 0.016
(0.028) (0.059) (0.028)
Correct guess 0.033 0.267** 0.027
(0.048) (0.117) (0.063)
Distance from correct guess −2.414* 5.257 −2.154
(1.345) (4.125) (1.666)
Absolute distance from correct guess −0.938 −5.797* −0.230
(1.065) (3.174) (1.418)
N 214 217 214
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up 0.010 −0.015 0.026
(0.016) (0.057) (0.019)
Correct guess −0.030 −0.066 −0.028
(0.035) (0.088) (0.039)
Distance from correct guess −0.610 −0.544 −2.353
(1.386) (3.409) (1.487)
Absolute distance from correct guess 1.900* 3.191 1.480
(1.094) (2.609) (1.154)
N 392 400 392
Notes: Heterogeneity analysis by adding an interaction term to the IV-regression. The
interaction term is dependent on the number of treated friends of the subjects. The
model controls for pre-specified covariates and is coinciding with Model (2) from the
main analysis. Robust standard errors clustered at class level in paranthesis. Each cell is
a unique regression. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
In total, our heterogeneity analysis does not provide any clear insight into the importance
of network characteristics on treatment and spillover effects. We do find some implications
of a relationship between the number of friends and the magnitude of treatment, but the




7.1 Balance and bias
Imbalances in baseline characteristics between treatment and control group could be a
potential threat to causality. The main concern is that any of the imbalanced covariates
are predictive of the outcome variable, thus contributing to omitted variable bias. This
section is dedicated to discussing the potential effects the baseline characteristics could
have on the outcome. In the following section, we expand on this analysis and then test
whether our intuition holds when controlling for the imbalanced covariates.
Recalling the results from table 4.1, we see that the first sign of imbalance between
treatment and control group is evident in the Female variable. Our data suggests that
being a female student is associated with better initial guesses regarding peers’ time spent
on homework (see Appendix A3.1). A difference in baseline distribution of female and
male students could then have an impact on the estimated treatment effect. Since the
initial wedge is lower for female students, one reasonable suspicion is that the treatment
will have limited effect. Thus, if we do not control for this imbalance in our analysis, we
would expect to see a negative bias in our treatment effect (Panel A), and a positive bias
in our spillover effect (Panel B).
We do not find any evidence of differential initial beliefs across the other imbalanced
baseline characteristics. However, there seems to be some differences in initial time
planned on homework. Both female, Norwegian grade > 4 and importance grades > 3 are
associated with higher time planned to homework. The relationships are significant at a 1
% level. This does reflect some underlying difference in attitude across different baseline
characteristics.
Another main concern with imbalanced covariates is that observed imbalances also reflect
imbalances in the unobserved characteristics. This is a far more pressing issue, as we have
no means of controlling for of measuring these kinds of differences.
36 7.2 Attrition
7.2 Attrition
We check for attrition and it’s effects by constraining our estimations to the respondents
who participated in the follow-up survey. Our concern is that there is differential attrition
rates conditional on treatment status, which could potentially skew our analysis by
contributing to violation of the independence assumption and the condition of randomly
distributed treatment.
From Table 7.1 we see that the attrition rate was on average 24% for the below median
students and 20% for the above median students. The estimated coefficient in column 3
tells us that there is a 7 percentage points lower attrition rate for students above median
in the treated classes. This suggests that students subject to spillover of treatment effects
are more likely to stay in the study relative to their untreated peers. We don’t see any
evidence for differential attrition for the below-median students.
Table 7.1: Attrition rate
Mean C Mean T T-C (se) n.obs
Panel A: Below median
Attrition rate 0.24 0.24 −0.01 (0.045) 287
Panel B: Above median
Attrition rate 0.24 0.17 −0.07** (0.033) 504
Notes: Attrition rate by regressing a dummy for participation in the follow-up
survey on treatment status. Controlled for strata fixed effects and standard
errors clustered at class level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
To investigate whether attrition might affect the distribution of baseline characteristics in
our sample, we re-estimate our model for balance testing on a subsample consisting of
only students whom respond to both surveys. The differences in baseline characteristics
are summed up in table 7.2.
Relative to the full sample, we see that there are indeed a few more baseline characteristics
that are significantly different between the treatment and control group. For Panel A,
we see imbalance in the gender indicator and returns to studying Norwegian. For Panel
B, we find the same imbalances as for the full sample with an addition of the number of
friends. The differences are about the same, but the significance is lower. Interestingly,
we do not see any evidence for differences in initial beliefs in the restricted sample, as we
7.2 Attrition 37
do in the full sample. The discrepancy between significant variables in the full sample
and the restricted sample does indeed imply that attrition might prove an issue for the
internal validity of our results.
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Table 7.2: Baseline characteristics of subsample responding to follow-up survey
Mean C Mean T T-C (se) n.obs
Panel A: Below median
Female 0.30 0.44 0.15** (0.059) 217
Time homework 14.95 15.05 1.79 (1.797) 218
Dislikes homework 0.84 0.77 −0.00 (0.046) 218
Grades
Standardized grade math 0.01 −0.017 −0.02 (0.130) 218
Standardized grade Norwegian −0.09 −0.15 −0.08 (0.153) 218
Returns to studying Norwegian 0.51 0.44 −0.12* (0.060) 218
Returns to studying math 0.64 0.55 −0.09 (0.097) 218
Attitudes
Importance grades > 3 0.90 0.84 −0.05 (0.040) 218
Pleasing parents > 3 0.65 0.63 0.01 (0.071) 218
Expectation of parents > 3 0.92 0.86 −0.07 (0.052) 218
Pleasing teachers > 3 0.47 0.49 −0.01 (0.082) 218
Expectations of teachers > 3 0.83 0.83 −0.02 (0.046) 218
Importance of popularity > 3 0.78 0.73 −0.05 (0.054) 218
Popularity schoolwork < 3 0.25 0.19 −0.06 (0.055) 218
Friendship
Number of in friends 3.18 2.94 −0.42 (0.319) 215
Number of out friends 3.02 2.96 −0.17 (0.315) 215
Number of reciprocal friends 6.19 5.90 −0.60 (0.617) 215
Eigencentrality 0.45 0.51 0.04 (0.046) 215
Many friends outside class 0.50 0.36 −0.10 (0.061) 218
Beliefs
Guessed median - class median main survey −18.56 −17.30 −0.31 (1.742) 218
abs(guessed median - class median) main survey 19.59 19.93 0.81 (1.354) 218
Wedge main survey 0.34 0.32 −0.03 (0.026) 218
Guessed median = class median main survey 0.10 0.09 0.00 (0.042) 218
Panel B: Above median
Female 0.66 0.57 −0.12*** (0.041) 400
Time homework 48.50 47.52 −0.08 (1.605) 400
Dislikes homework 0.62 0.58 −0.04 (0.041) 400
Grades
Standardized grade math 0.12 0.15 −0.03 (0.073) 400
Standardized grade Norwegian 0.26 0.13 −0.20** (0.076) 400
Returns to studying Norwegian 0.31 0.37 0.05 (0.044) 400
Returns to studying math 0.59 0.57 0.03 (0.046) 400
Attitudes
Importance grades > 3 0.93 0.84 −0.08** (0.030) 400
Pleasing parents > 3 0.72 0.78 0.09** (0.038) 400
Expectation of parents > 3 0.92 0.92 −0.00 (0.024) 400
Pleasing teachers > 3 0.62 0.67 0.06 (0.039) 400
Expectations of teachers > 3 0.88 0.88 −0.01 (0.027) 400
Importance of popularity > 3 0.76 0.79 0.04 (0.027) 400
Popularity schoolwork < 3 0.16 0.21 0.05 (0.032) 400
Friendship
Number of in friends 3.04 2.93 −0.28 (0.199) 392
Number of out friends 3.23 2.93 −0.48** (0.221) 392
Number of reciprocal friends 6.27 5.86 −0.76* (0.404) 392
Eigencentrality 0.47 0.52 0.03 (0.031) 392
Many friends outside class 0.39 0.37 0.00 (0.045) 400
Beliefs
Guessed median - class median main survey −4.04 −3.88 −0.31 (2.087) 400
abs(guessed median - class median) main survey 12.90 13.63 1.24 (1.019) 400
Wedge main survey 0.14 0.12 −0.04 (0.027) 400
Guessed median = class median main survey 0.27 0.27 0.01 (0.031) 400
Notes: Female is a manually coded variable based on the name of the student. The first and second columns
show the mean value of the row variables for the control and treatment group, respectively. The third column
shows the estimated coefficient from a regression of the baseline characteristic on treatment status, controlling
for strata fixed effects. The fourth column includes robust standard errors, clustered at the class level
(corresponding with randomization level). Each row includes a separate regression. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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We test for the impact of these imbalances by estimating a model without any controls
and a model where we control for the imbalanced covariates, and compare them. Table
7.3 shows the estimated coefficients of treatment for the two different models. We see that
the coefficient for wedge is significant for both panels and both models. Considering the
other outcome variables, we see that distance and absolute distance both have equally
significant effects. Moreover, model (2) seems to be estimating a somewhat stronger
treatment effect. In Panel B, the two estimated effects are almost identical, both in
magnitude and significance.
Table 7.3: IV estimation controlling for unbalanced subsample
(1) (2)
No controls Controlling for imbalance
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up −0.109*** −0.108***
(0.034) (0.036)
Correct guess 0.066 0.050
(0.054) (0.057)
Distance from correct guess 4.930** 5.792**
(2.150) (2.331)
Absolute distance from correct guess −3.796** −4.576**
(1.587) (1.802)
N 218 214
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.073** −0.072**
(0.030) (0.030)
Correct guess 0.077 0.070
(0.049) (0.046)
Distance from correct guess 1.266 1.690
(2.163) (2.024)
Absolute distance from correct guess −0.482 −0.207
(1.148) (1.210)
N 400 392
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from an IV-regression using only indicators for
strata fixed effects as covariates. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a similar IV-
regression, but also including controls for imbalanced baseline characteristics. Robust
standard errors clustered at class level in parenthesis below each coefficient. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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While our discussion of the attrition rate raised some concern about the internal validity
of our analysis, we do not see any evidence of stark differences between a model estimated
with and without controls for the imbalanced covariates. Our main outcome measures
remains stable across both models, which suggests that differential attrition does not
affect the analysis in any noticeable way.
7.3 Issues with randomization
For our main analysis, we use an IV approach. This is to avoid issues with non-compliance
and treatment dilution. However, we also have a variable in our data set which indicates
what schools were experiencing issues with the implementation of the treatment. In the
absence of non-compliance, the estimated ITT effect corresponds with the LATE. The
following section will present our main results from the IV analysis and compare them
to a alternative model where we restrict our sample to only the classes with successful
implementation of treatment.
From Table 7.4 we see that the differences between the two models are minuscule for
all outcomes except the wedge measure in Panel B. Here, both the significance and the
estimated effect is substantially smaller for the restricted sample. For all other variables,
both the estimate and the significance support the same conclusion regarding the effect of
treatment. The differences we see in the estimates could be the result of a smaller sample
in one of the models.
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Table 7.4: Difference between ITT on successful randomization and IV on full sample
(1) (2)
Issue = 0 IV
Panel A: Direct effect
Wedge follow up −0.095* −0.091**
(0.050) (0.042)
Correct guess 0.100* 0.109**
(0.060) (0.046)
Distance from correct guess 5.711* 5.939**
(3.274) (2.428)
Absolute distance from correct guess −5.515*** −4.977***
(1.805) (1.470)
N 191 217
Panel B: Spillover effect
Wedge follow up −0.047 −0.057**
(0.031) (0.025)
Correct guess 0.030 0.083
(0.059) (0.054)
Distance from correct guess 0.257 0.182
(1.833) (1.550)
Absolute distance from correct guess 0.011 −1.008
(1.236) (1.065)
N 330 400
Notes: Model (1) shows the coefficient from an reduced form regression
restricted to the school where there are no confirmed issues with
randomization. Model (2) shows the coefficient from a IV-regression on the
whole dataset, corresponding with the main model. Both model controls
for predetermined baseline characteristics, as well as strata fixed effects.
Robust standard errors clustered at class level in parenthesis below each




Our thesis depends on students misperceptions about peers’ time spent on homework.
While there are many possible explanations for this misperception, one reasonable intuition
is related to misreporting among students. For example, if a student thinks that everyone
else in their peer group is spending a small amount of time doing homework, they will
naturally believe that doing less homework is socially desirable. However, such beliefs
might be incorrect, and the stigma associated with this attitude could lead to incorrect
beliefs. If the students believe that doing more homework is stigmatized, they might
be reluctant to talk about it and reveal their private views to others. If most students
act this way, they might all end up believing that their private views are only shared by
at best a small minority. Furthermore, this leads to a preference falsification, in which
the students reported preferences are affected by social acceptability, providing a biased
summary of the class’ view on homework. This could potentially update the student’s
beliefs about the share of people with negative views towards homework and make the
students reluctant to talk about and reveal their private views to their peers.
Our analysis suggests some evidence of the above intuition. We find that the baseline
difference in guessed proportion and the actual proportion of peers below median time
spent on homework is high. Since students cannot observe the actual time spent on
homework among their peers, they are dependent on the information their peers provide
them. Thus, it is reasonable to attribute some of the differences between the actual
and the perceived situation to misreporting. Our analysis also suggests positive spillover
effects, implying that updating some students’ beliefs with correct information about their
peers’ time spent on homework reduces the misreporting among students.
8.2 Limitations of the data set
As mentioned in Section 4.1, our study is based on self-reported data. The justification of
this is that only the students themselves can report how much time they plan to allocate
to different activities. In addition, most interactions in friendships occurs outside of public
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view, or at least away from the attention of adults. Thus, it seems necessary to rely on
the students to report information about planned allocation of time and friendship ties.
However, being in their adolescence the students are not necessarily reliable reporters of
their experiences in group relationships or regarding time spent on different activities.
Misreporting could lead to unreliable datasets in relation to the actual situation, however,
this issue is equally present in the control group and the treatment group, and thus does
not affect internal validity.
Most of the questions the students are presented with in the surveys have pre-determined
options in which the students have to choose from. However, some of the questions allows
for the students to write the answer themselves, e.g., writing the date of their latest test
in a given subject. These open questions present some problems, as we see a tendency of
misreporting among the students. In order to get a representative data set, we depend
on the students writing a valid answer. An aspect that further increases this concern,
is the monetary price connected to the surveys. By completing the follow-up survey for
instance, the students become part of a lottery in which three of the students in each
class are rewarded 200 NOK. This might lead some students to quickly going through the
survey, not paying attention to what they answer, with the sole purpose of being part of
the lottery. Moreover, this could lead to a misrepresentation of how many of the students
actually improved their beliefs after being treated, which in turn could lead to falsified
spillover effects.
A second potential problem is the fact that the female variable is manually coded based on
the first name of the student. We must take into account that the proportion of girls might
be incorrect. Both because there might be gender neutral names placed in the wrong
category, or simply that some girls have "boys’" names or vice versa. The uncertainty
regarding this baseline characteristic might be problematic, and it is important to interpret
these results with caution. Generally, it is hard to confirm that the effects we find are
completely valid, as we do not have the true distribution of girls and boys among the
students.
A third problem, regarding the spillover effects, is identifying the peers with the strongest
source of influence. In our study, we assume that the students are affected by the peers
they list as their friends. However, one could argue that adolescents could be more
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influenced by those whom they want to be friends with, or groups to which they aspire for
membership. If the latter is true, even though the students reported friends are treated,
we might not observe a spillover effect as expected if the ones they want to be friends
with is not treated, or we might find a spillover effect in cases where a student’s reported
friends are not treated.
All of the above limitations are mainly a concern for external validity. Since the issues are
present for both the treatment and control group, we would expect our analysis to return
credible estimates applicable to our sample.
In our analysis we distinguish between in-friends, out-friends, total friends and reciprocal
friends. In-friends is the number of peers who have reported a student as their friend,
out-friends is the number of peers a student report as their friends, total friends is the total
of the two, excluding any overlapping friendship ties, and reciprocal friends is the number
of friendship ties where two students have reported each other. There is some uncertainty
related to the dynamics of the different terms. Considering the nature of friendship ties,
it is reasonable to believe that any one of these measures imply interaction between two
students, regardless of being directed or undirected. The intuition behind this is that
it is nearly impossible to consider a one-way friendship. Thus, the interpretation of the
different measures could become somewhat complex, and we should be cautious when
interpreting our analysis.
8.3 Limitations of the estimation strategy
As explained in subsection 5.1, there are three assumptions that must be satisfied in order
for the IV-estimation to be meaningful, the relevance assumption, exclusion restriction,
and the independence assumption.
The independence assumption is trivially satisfied because randomization is expected to
lead to equally distributed confounders across assignment groups. However, we can never
guarantee that the instrument itself is not correlated with the unobserved random effects
captured in the regression model. If it is, the independence assumption would be violated,
and our results would be biased.
One indirect way of assessing this assumption is to look at whether there is imbalance in
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measured covariates across the levels of the proposed instrument. Imbalance in measured
covariates can in principle be eliminated by adjusting for them in the analysis, but such
imbalances can be suggestive of imbalance across unmeasured variables. As shown in
subsection 4.3.1, we find some differences between the treatment and the control group in
both panels. Due to the slight imbalances we find in our dataset, we have to be careful
when interpreting our results, as this might lead to the test returning a statistically
significant effect when there in fact is no such effect, or non-significant results when there
in fact is significant effects.
Furthermore, as IV estimations represent the effect of our variable of interest on individuals
who react to the instrument, it is important to know who these individuals are in order
to draw meaningful policy implications. When looking at the LATE in a randomized
experiment, we have to consider the characteristics among the compliers compared to
the population. Compliers may be composed of different sub-populations with different
treatment effects, and as shown in subsection 6.3, we observe some heterogenous effects.
Thus, we have to be cautious when interpreting and extrapolating the results.
8.3.1 Differences in estimated models
Throughout the analysis we have relied on three different specification in order to estimate
our models. The main difference between them relates to the included covariates. Model (1)
does not include any covariates. Under the strict assumptions for a successful randomized
control trial, this specification should give us unbiased estimates of the treatment effect.
However, as discussed earlier, there might be some predetermined characteristics that
are predictive of the outcome variable. Including these in the analysis should increase
the precision of our estimates. Thus, model (2) provides us with estimates that control
for all pre-determined characteristics we believe ex-ante are affecting the students beliefs
about time spent on homework. However, this model is susceptible to crowding out effects,
especially for smaller sample sizes.
The final model was estimated using a post double lasso selection procedure. This ensures
that all, if any, included covariates have a strong mechanical relation to the outcome
variable. This method effectively removes our influence over the analysis, providing us
with a neutral model without any subjective biases. We partial out the identifiers for
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strata fixed effect, but allow the selection procedure to decide which other covariates to
include.
The issue of which model is the most reliable and precise, is open for discussion. With a
lack of dramatic differences between the three models, it is difficult for us to argue for one
model’s superiority. Instead we rely on the notion that if all models are supporting the
same conclusion, we can safely argue for a successful analysis.
8.4 External validity
An important concern with our design regards the external validity of the findings. There
are several important qualifications to the generality of the treatment effects we estimate.
Our treatment and spillover effects are estimated from the behavior of a particular sample
of students. In our paper, we consider a sample of 10th graders in Norway. First, we
focus on change in our main outcome variable, planned time spent on homework, upon
treatment. Second, we include the additional information students might acquire after
interacting with their peers. The peers we study are very close – often friends and in the
same class, and they form their associations naturally and endogenously.
As previously mentioned, adolescents are in a period of great vulnerability to peer effects
in addition to a strong desire to fit in. These attributes are not specific to adolescents in
our school, but general attributes for adolescent. However, there are many attributes in
which the 10th graders we study might differ from other students. First, the Norwegian
culture might be quite different from other countries, impacting how the students interact
and are influenced by each other. Second, there are institutional differences between
countries, making it hard to transfer our findings directly to other schools and countries.
Third, the Norwegian homework structure might differ from those in other countries. In
addition to these attributes, there might also be differences between countries, and how
well developed they are. For example, a lot of peer influence among Norwegian students
today might happen through their phones and social media. Students in some countries,
however, might not have access to these means of communication, affecting the peer
influence part of the study.
Even though some of our effects could be transferable to students in other schools and
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countries, it is hard to fully confirm this without further studies on the differences between
schools and countries, and the importance of different independent variables for each of
these.
8.5 Implications of the COVID-19 epidemic
The lockdowns in response to Covid-19 have interrupted conventional schooling with
nationwide school closures in Norway. During the previous year, students have alternated
between being at school and having digital classes at home. Since most of our experiment
was conducted while covid unfolded, and because we can’t be certain when and if the
different subject schools were at school or home, there is a concern that this could have
impacted our results. The main survey was always conducted at school with a minimum
of one meter between each student, ensuring the students’ privacy when answering the
questions. However, there are especially two consequences of the epidemic and students
having classes at home that potentially could impact our results.
First, the tasks students perform might not be identical to the situation in which there is
physical attendance at school. Students doing everything from home could lead to most
tasks being perceived as either homework or schoolwork, making it harder to distinguish
between the two. Furthermore, this could lead to incorrect beliefs about how much
homework one plans to do, and how much homework one has done. Second, both national
and regional infection prevention measures have led to a significant reduction in student’s
opportunity to socialize with others outside of school, and they haven’t been exposed
to their usual social groups or classrooms. In addition to having classes at home, this
severely reduces the opportunities to be affected by the other students and could thus
have an impact on our spillover effect.
8.6 Long term vs short term
We find that the information contained in our intervention increased planned time spend
on homework among the participants, as well as improving their precision in guessing
their peers’ time spent on homework in the short run (about 2 weeks after intervention).
The magnitude of the effects we observe may reflect the relatively short time horizons
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over which outcomes are measured. In regard to the beliefs on how much time peers spent
on homework, the outcome tests belief on schoolwork that was done during the previous
week. This deviates from many other educational studies, which cover a semester or a
year’s worth of material. If beliefs decay over time, it may result in a reduction of the
measured impact of the treatment over time. This could have methodical implications for




This master thesis studies the effect of providing 10th-grade students with information
about their peers time spent on homework. The data was collected from an ongoing
experiment conducted by researchers at NHH. In total our data set consists of observations
from 17 schools. The study is based on students’ self reported study time and grades, as
well as preferences towards homework and other activities.
Our results suggests that treatment both increases the future time planned on homework
and improves the students precision in guessing their peers’ time spent on homework. One
hypothesis supported by the results is that treated students are underestimating ex ante
and treatment nudges them to increase their estimates, resulting in more overestimation
ex post. However, the total effect shows a positive development in overall precision. Our
analysis also suggests an association between negative attitudes towards homework and a
weaker treatment effect, and high achievement and stronger treatment effect.
We find some evidence of spillover effects, particularly regarding students’ precision in
guessing. Students not eligible for treatment in treated classes see a spillover effect in the
same direction as the treatment effect, but with reduced magnitude.
All results remain relatively stable across different estimation specifications and sub-
samples. We run robustness checks by including imbalanced baseline covariates and by
controlling for attrition, without seeing any substantial difference in results. We also test
for heterogeneous spillover effect conditional on centrality measures in the network, but
do not find any compelling evidence.
The main policy implication of these findings relate to the efficiency of informational
interventions in the school system. We see that a simple informative notice has the potential
to change students intentions in the short term, and also influence their perceptions in
the longer term. These types of interventions are relatively low-cost and low-impact, and
could be implemented on a larger scale without substantial effort.
The focus of our analysis has been on the perceptions and beliefs of 10th-graders in Norway.
Our thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the treatment effect and
transmission of treatment effects through social networks. While our analysis has focused
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solely on the beliefs of the students, it would be interesting to further investigate the
direct behavioral impact such an intervention could have.
It would also be interesting to investigate the long term effects of this intervention. Our
analysis is limited to the duration of the study, but it would be interesting to follow the
students for a longer period of time to see how their beliefs and attitudes develop. An
extension of this is also to further develop the heterogeneity analysis in order to better
understand the dynamics that determine the treatment effect.
Finally, while we did not find any clear evidence for differential network effects, it would
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A2 First Stage estimation
Table A2.1: Results from the first stage regressions
 ̂ (se) F-stat N
Panel A: Direct effect
Table 6.3 and 6.4 0.951*** (0.031) 74.26 217
Table 7.4 (1) 0.944*** (0.036) 1187.94 218
Table 7.4 (2) 0.941*** (0.027) 51898.25 214
Panel B: Spillover effect
Table 6.3 and 6.4 0.853*** (0.067) 5.62 400
Table 7.4 (1) 0.859*** (0.066) 177.75 400
Table 7.4 (2) 0.850*** (0.069) 940.27 392
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficient of the instrument from
the first stage of the two stage least squares regression from the analysis.
The model contains controls for pre-determined baseline characteristics
and strata fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered at class level. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A3.1: The difference in initial beliefs conditional on baseline characteristics
Time homework Initial wedge
Female 9.94*** −0.05***
(1.426) (0.019)
Norwegian grade > 4 5.69*** 0.01
(1.450) (0.021)
Importance grades > 3 8.80*** −0.01
(2.375) (0.028)
Expectation of parents > 3 2.74 −0.02
(2.691) (0.025)
Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients of a
regression of the column-variable on the row-variable. Robust
standard errors clustered at class level in parenthesis. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
